>>>  名人論史——近當代作家的史學觀點  >>>

簡體     傳統

Being a Successful Gorbachev?

To be a “successful Gorbachev” requires holding all levers of power in order to push through deep reforms.

By Yang Hengjun

March 18, 2014

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The host invited me to talk about today China’s political situation. But to talk about this, I would want to complain and to criticize, and I long ago made a rule: not to criticize China overseas. If I’m going to criticize China, I will return to China first and then proceed. So today, I can only talk about Gorbachev, a foreign retired leader, more than 80 years old. Talking about him is very safe.

From the common people to the leaders, China’s “Gorbachev complex” is very serious. There are people who hope that China will soon have its own Gorbachev, and there are also people who are trying their hardest to avoid the emergence of a Chinese Gorbachev. For those who want a Chinese Gorbachev, it’s because he was committed to reform, almost single-handedly ended the Cold War, toppled the powerful but fairly sinister Soviet empire, and brought democracy to Russia and other countries. Others hate Gorbachev because his reforms failed. Not only did he cause the downfall of the ruling Communist Party, he also made a superpower crumble overnight. Plus, the democratic transitions in the ensuring 20 years have not been smooth.

Were Gorbachev’s reforms wrong? Could his failure have been avoided? If Gorbachev’s reforms had succeeded, what would the result have been? Everyone knows my assessment of Gorbachev, but today I’d like to proceed from a different angle and do some more objective analysis, to better understand the Soviet Union. It’s also additional food for thought for China.

The Soviet system is not unfamiliar to us. After Gorbachev came to power, the system was already coming close to the “seventy years limit” I’ve spoken of before: it was corrupt and difficult to operate. Its collapse was imminent. Gorbachev followed the historical tide—he put forward the “new thinking” and implemented reform, trying to save the party and the state. Even those people who fume about Gorbachev don’t dare to attack the content of Gorbachev’s reforms. The reason is very simple: how can it be wrong to make the government transparent, destroy totalitarianism, return power to the people, realize democracy, and give people more freedom? No one would be stupid enough to radically criticize the content of Gorbachev’s reforms. Otherwise, even before criticizing Gorbachev, the critic would show himself to be rotten.

Reform was necessary. Without reform, the state dies, so reform! But Gorbachev’s reform failed, and his failure caused the ruling party to lose power and led to the collapse of a vast empire. Many people say that the reason for his failure was that the Soviet Union was terminally ill—reform and improvement could not save it. The only options were revolution or waiting for it to die a natural death. The only thing you could do is hope that your own health is good enough so that you could survive a bit longer than the state. There’s some truth to this. For systems like the Soviet Union’s, there was no precedent for successful reform. Gorbachev’s efforts were like walking forward in total darkness, refusing to accept failure until he was forced to. But this argument still does not deter our pursuit for the other reasons Gorbachev’s reforms failed.

In hindsight, let’s imagine if Gorbachev’s reform had stuck to “eating the meat” without “biting into the bones.” What if his reform had been small-scale, with lots of noise but little results? Or what if he had tried “crossing the river by feeling the stones” in the economic sphere, gradually relaxing the rigid, planned economy’s control over the public and no longer preventing people’s desire to get rich? In that case, his reform could not have been successful. It also wouldn’t have caused many problems and, what’s more, couldn’t have really failed. Perhaps the Soviet system could have continued for several years or even decades. Gorbachev would have been the envy of his successors, a Soviet version of Deng Xiaoping. But the moment Gorbachev came to power, he went straight to “biting into the bones”: tackling the difficult reforms of the political system and of society.

Ordinarily, this is right. The problem was that Gorbachev thought he had a lot of authority. He was very confident about the Soviet system, his “new thinking” theory and his chosen road for reform. Without having gained absolute control of the army, police power, and the authority to reform, he immediately started talking the most difficult reforms. And what was the result?

During that short period, when Gorbachev spoke of democracy, Yeltsin was more democratic than him in almost every way. When Gorbachev spoke of adhering to the leadership of the party, party conservatives were more Communist than him in almost every way. He took the lead in loosening control of the media, but the media were not willing to let him off the hook. Almost as soon as the reform began, Gorbachev lost control of it. In less than a few years, he had made enemies of forces inside and outside the system, as well as both the left and the right. To the extreme conservatives, he was seen a as “traitor to socialism,” while at the same time the extreme liberals labeled him a “traitor to democracy and freedom.” Gorbachev’s situation back then was a bit like mine on the internet today: looked down on by both the left and the right.

So, was it possible for Gorbachev’s reform to succeed? Not only Gorbachev himself, but also his successors believed this was possible. In fact, at the beginning Gorbachev’s reform, both in its direction and its specific content, actually received support from the enlightened group within the system, from the liberal intellectuals, and from most of the people. If Gorbachev had had more clear goals and a “top-down design” rather than taking a “crossing the river by feeling the stones” mentality into the deep waters of reform; if he had grasped the party, the government, and especially the military and police (KGB) power firmly in his own hands rather than having elder party members dividing his power and challenging his authority; if he had from start to finish placed reform under the leadership of the party rather than listening to the attacks of either conservative or liberal forces—then, from both a tactical and a technical level, the probability of success would have been great.

But there is a problem: in accordance with the Soviet system (and we Chinese are very familiar with, aren’t we?), if you want to place reform under the absolute control of Gorbachev, he would need to follow the same practices he is resolved to get rid of. He needed to make a severe extralegal attack on autocracy and corruption within the system—this way he could have avoided the coup that had him imprisoned for three days. He needed to fight a merciless battle against Yeltsin and the rest of the democracy advocates within the party, shutting them up or even putting them under house arrest—this way he could have avoided these figures always taking the high ground during the democratic reform process, having the authorities shoulder responsibility for the “src sin,” and having Gorbachev himself passively suffer scoldings from every direction. Gorbachev needed to triumph over the extreme conservatives and at the same time use more extreme measures to deal with the liberals and the media—this way he could have avoided not having any way to handle them after opening up (instead, in the end, the media almost all rose up to “handle” Gorbachev).

But all these steps and measures mean running in the opposite direction of the goal Gorbachev pursued! When Gorbachev tried to make his end and his means consistent, he was quickly eaten up by his own reforms. As the saying goes, “the revolution devours its children.”

Even more interesting—this Gorbachev, who was eaten by his reforms, actually cemented his historical legacy by failing. To be clearer: Gorbachev’s failure was his biggest success.

Personal success does not necessarily indicate the people’s success; personal failure sometimes actually means historic victory. It’s rare to have failure cement someone’s status as a “great man” in history. Gorbachev is one of these cases. But for a long time, Gorbachev himself did not agree with this type of “greatness.” After stepping down, Gorbachev traveled to the West to give speeches. When people regard him as a hero who overthrew the Soviet Union, he repeatedly said, “If party conservatives and radicals like Yeltsin had not ruined it, my reform would have succeeded, and the Soviet Union wouldn’t have fallen.” Gorbachev’s meaning is clear: if his reform had succeeded, the Soviet Union would have eventually moved toward freedom, democracy and the rule of law, but without Yeltsin’s ten years of chaos (including the economic crisis) and without Putin using an immature democratic system and electorate to create a “dictatorship.” The Soviet Union would not have disintegrated into more than a dozen countries.

In the last few years, there have been an immense number of books about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, but almost nobody has the imagination envision such an outcome: if Gorbachev had succeeded in his reforms, what would the result be? A prosperous, strong, democratic, free Soviet Union as socialist superpower? Or would it only mean Gorbachev’s personal victory—with Gorbachev still serving as the Soviet Union’s chairman and general secretary, becoming, at over 80 years old, one of the world’s longest serving dictators (dwarfing Suharto, Mubarak and Gaddafi)?

Gorbachev has left us a textbook full of experiences and lessons. Reform is necessary, there’s no doubt. Few people challenge that the goal and the direction of reform should conform to historical trends, and even the manner, methods and procedures of reform are not an issue. The question is whether or not the leader implementing reform has the authority and power to see the reforms through. After an authoritative leader obtains power, he won’t necessarily reform (for example, leaders such as North Korea’s Kim dynasty, Egypt’s Mubarak and Libya’s Gaddafi). An authoritative leader who is willing to reform may not reform all the way (such as Deng Xiaoping). But a leader who wants to thoroughly reform must hold absolute authority in order to be successful (for example, Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo).

Those who deny the direction and content of Gorbachev’s reform must know that going against the tide of history can only delay the inevitable for a short while. If anti-human systems don’t reform, in the end, the leaders and the system will be swept together into the dustbin of history. You have great power, but this only means having the power to bring yourself historical shame. Today, China in many respects has already surpassed the reforms Gorbachev pushed forward in the Soviet Union.

At the same time, those who hope for a Chinese Gorbachev should realize no leader in the world is willing to be eaten by his own reforms. In China, aren’t there even fewer leaders in the reform school who are willing to be destroyed by the reforms they began and promoted?

The historical choices are not many. How can we choose the path of Gorbachev’s reform, but without repeating his mistakes? How can we be a successful Gorbachev—neither the Gorbachev whose reforms failed, nor the Gorbachev who is thought successful because his reforms failed, but a Gorbachev whose reforms succeed? Obviously, this requires not only political ideals, but also political authority, political wisdom, and political skill.

At a time when the Russians have gradually forgotten Gorbachev, and Western enthusiasm for him has died, China’s “Gorbachev complex” is still going strong. History cannot be predicted. The Soviet Union’s reform has already ended, but China’s reform is not only not finished, but new reforms are just getting started. China, with a system similar to the Soviet Union’s, is still walking alone on the path towards the future. China needs a reforming Gorbachev, but this Gorbachev definitely won’t hope for his own reforms to fail.

I’m talking about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and taking the 83-year old Gorbachev as my target—this must really disappoint those friends who wanted to hear me throw out incisive opinions on China’s political situation. Please allow me to make a joke: if I were Gorbachev, what would I do? I guess I would have no choice. I would follow the historical tides, and make a top-down plan to lead the Soviet Union towards freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and prosperity. I would seize control of the military police and the national security apparatus, secure the power to initiate reforms, defeat the extreme forces on both the left and the right, and then implement reform measures step by step…

Unfortunately, I’m not Gorbachev, and even though I’m forcing myself to imagine Gorbachevs, I actually don’t have much confidence in the system he represents. So I tend to agree that Gorbachev’s great success lies in his failure. I hope that in the future Gorbachev can succeed, and transform his success into the success of the people, the country, and the nation.

This piece srcly appeared in Chinese on Yang Hengjun’s blog. The src post can be found here.

Yang Hengjun is a Chinese independent scholar, novelist, and blogger. He once worked in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. Yang received his Ph.D. from the University of Technology, Sydney in Australia. His Chinese language blog is featured on major Chinese current affairs and international relations portals and his pieces receive millions of hits each day. Yang’s blog can be accessed at www.yanghengjun.com

原文：

做一名成功的戈尔巴乔夫？

文 | 杨恒均

今天主持人邀请我谈谈中国政局，但一谈这个，我就要发牢骚、就要批评，可我早就立下了规矩，不在海外批评中国，要批评中国，我会回国再批。所以，我今天只能讲讲戈尔巴乔夫，一位外国退休的领导人，八十多岁了，讲起来很安全。

中国朝野的“戈尔巴乔夫情结”非常严重，有人希望中国尽快出一名戈尔巴乔夫，有人在竭力避免中国的戈尔巴乔夫出现。想中国出戈尔巴乔夫，是因为他锐意改革，几乎是以一人之力结束了冷战，终结了强大但相当邪恶的苏联帝国，给俄罗斯等国家带来了民主。有人讨厌戈尔巴乔夫，是因为这位老兄的改革失败了，不但导致执政的共产党下岗，还让超级大国一夜之间分崩离析，连接下来20多年的民主转型也不那么平稳。

戈尔巴乔夫的改革错了吗？他的失败是可以避免的吗？如果戈尔巴乔夫的改革成功了，又会有什么样的结果？——大家都知道我对戈尔巴乔夫的评价，但今天我想从另外一个角度和层面做一些更加客观的分析，让各位了解苏联——也对中国多一份思考。

苏联体制大家都不陌生，到了戈尔巴乔夫上台后，已接近我说的“七十年大限”：腐化堕落，几乎难以运转，倒台是分分钟的事，戈尔巴乔夫顺应历史潮流，提出了“新思维”，进行改革，试图挽救党和国家。即便那些对戈氏咬牙切齿的人，也没有敢对戈氏改革的内容进行攻击的，原因很简单，难道透明政府、瓦解极权、还权于民、实现民主、给人民更多自由会错吗？没有人会傻到对戈氏的改革内容提出过激的批判，否则他还没有批倒戈氏，自己就先臭了。

改革是必须的，不改亡国，改了呢——戈氏的改革失败了，他的失败导致执政党下台，引发一个庞大帝国的瓦解。很多人说失败的原因是因为苏联得的是绝症，改革改良都挽救不了它，只能革命，或者等它自然死亡，你唯一能做的就是希望自己身体够好，能够活得比它更长一些。这话不是没有道理，像苏联这样的体制，确实没有改革成功的先例，几乎都是一头走到黑，不见棺材不掉泪。但这还是不影响我们追寻戈尔巴乔夫改革失败的其它一些原因。

回头看看，戈氏的改革如果是只吃肉不啃硬骨头，小打小闹，风声大雨点小，或者在经济领域摸石头过河，逐步放宽僵化计划经济对民众的控制，不阻止民众致富的愿望，他的改革即便不能成功，也不会出多大的问题，就更不会失败了，苏联体制很可能继续延续几年甚至几十年。戈氏也就成了他后来比较羡慕的苏联版的邓小平。但戈尔巴乔夫一上来就去啃硬骨头，搞政治体制与社会改革。

这个按说也没错，问题是他以为自己很有权威，对苏联的制度、他的“新思维”理论以及他选定的改革之路都很自信，大有“四个自信”的势头。在没有绝对掌握军、警大权以及改革的领导权之下，就开始了啃硬骨头的改革，结果怎么样呢？

有那么一段时间，戈尔巴乔夫一说民主，叶利钦几乎样样都比他更民主；他一说坚持党的领导，党内保守派几乎都比他更共产党；他率先放开对媒体的控制，媒体却都不愿意放过他。改革一开始，他几乎就失去了对改革的控制，几年不到，他把体制内外和左右两派都得罪了，被极端保守派视为“社会主义的叛徒”，同时又被极端自由主义分子贴上了“民主、自由的叛徒”的标签——戈氏当年的境况，很有点像老杨头当今在网络上的处境：左右不是人啊。

那么，戈氏的改革有可能成功吗？不但戈氏自己，他的后继者也都认为有这个可能。事实上，戈尔巴乔夫的改革无论从方向还是具体的内容上，一开始是确实得到了体制内开明派、广大知识分子以及大部分求变民众的支持的。如果戈尔巴乔夫能有更明确的目标和“顶层设计”，而不是在改革进入深水区后还抱着“摸石头过河”的心态，如果他能把党、政尤其是军、警（克格勃）的大权都牢牢掌握在自己手中，而不是被党内的老人指手画脚分掉了权力、损害了权威，如果他始终把“改革置于党的领导之下”（戈氏语）而不是听任体制内保守派以及极端民主派对自己左右夹击，他的改革从战术和技术层面来说，成功的可能性还是很大的。

只不过这就出现了一个问题：按照苏联的体制（我们都很熟悉，不是吗），如果要做到把改革始终置于戈尔巴乔夫的绝对领导之下，他必须得做的正是他立志要改掉的：对体制内的专权与腐败不通过法律手段进行严厉的打击（从而避免那些将军和克格勃发动政变，把他囚禁在别墅三天之久），对党内民主派叶利钦等人进行无情的斗争，让他们闭嘴甚至软禁起来（而不让他们总是在民主改革的进程中占据道德制高点，让当局背负“原罪”，让戈氏自己处处被动挨骂），把极左派弄得灰头灰脸，同时对自由派和媒体采取更加严厉的措施（而不是放开后无法收拾，最终媒体几乎都起来对付戈氏本人）……

可是，所有这些手段和措施却又同他追求的改革目标背道而驰！而当戈氏试图让追求的目标和手段一致时，他很快就被自己发起的改革吃掉了，正如“革命吃掉了自己的儿子”一样。

更有意思的是，被改革吃掉了的戈尔巴乔夫，却以他的失败奠定了自己的历史地位。说白一点就是：戈尔巴乔夫的失败正是他最大的成功。

个人的成功不一定预示民众的成功，个人的失败有时反而是历史的胜利。历史上很少有以失败奠定自己历史地位的“伟人”，戈尔巴乔夫就是其中之一。但相当长一段时间里，戈氏自己并不认同这种“伟大”。下台后的戈氏到西方各地演讲，当人家把他当成推翻苏联的英雄时，他自己却像祥林嫂一样反复叨念诸如“如果不是党内保守派和激进的叶利钦等人的破坏，我的改革会成功，苏联也不会倒”。戈氏的意思很清楚：如果他的改革成功了，苏联最终也会走向自由、民主与法治，反而少了叶利钦十年的混乱（包括物资匮乏）和普京十几年利用不成熟的民主体制与选民而搞的“独裁”，苏联也不会解体成十几个国家……

这些年论述苏联解体和戈尔巴乔夫的书汗牛充栋，可几乎没人有想像力设想这样一种结局：如果戈氏的改革成功了会怎样？一个繁荣、富强、民主、自由的苏联社会主义超级大国？或者那只不过是戈尔巴乔夫个人的胜利——能够让戈氏至今还盘踞在苏联国家主席与总书记的宝座上，成为80高龄、执政最久的独裁者之一？让苏哈托、穆巴拉克和卡扎菲都相形见拙？

戈尔巴乔夫给我们留下了一本充满经验和教训的教科书：必须改革，这没有疑问；改革的目标和方向也应该是符合历史大趋势，这个也没有多少人敢质疑和挑战，甚至改革的方式方法和步骤也不是问题，问题在于实行改革的领导人是否有权威与权力把改革进行到底。有权威的领导人掌握大权后并不一定会改革，例如金家王朝、穆巴拉克和卡扎菲之流的；有权威的领导人愿意改革的，也不一定一改到底，例如邓小平；但愿意彻底改革的领导人必须掌握绝对的权威，才能获得成功，例如蒋经国。

那些否定戈尔巴乔夫改革内容和方向的人必须认识到，倒行逆施只能让你苟延残喘一段时间，反人类的体制不改革，最终领导人和体制一起都会被扫进历史的垃圾堆。你拥有再大的权力，只不过是有权把自己的贴在历史的耻辱柱上而已。戈尔巴乔夫当年在苏联推行的改革，中国目前在很多方面都有过之而无不及。

同时，那些希望中国出现戈尔巴乔夫的人也应意识到，世界上是没有哪一个领导人愿意被自己发起的改革吃掉。在中国，被自己发起和推动的改革吃掉的改革派领导人还少吗？

历史留下的选择并不多，如何选择戈尔巴乔夫的改革道路，却又不重蹈他的覆辙，如何当一名成功的戈尔巴乔夫——不是那个改革失败的戈尔巴乔夫，也不是那个因改革失败而被认为成功了的戈尔巴乔夫，而是当一名成功改革的戈尔巴乔夫！很显然，这不但需要政治理想，也需要政治权威、政治智慧甚至政治手腕。

就在俄国人逐渐淡忘戈尔巴乔夫，西方人的热情不再之时，中国的“戈尔巴乔夫情结”却方兴未艾。历史不能假设，苏联的改革早已结束，但中国的改革非但没有结束，反而新的改革才刚刚起步，类似苏联体制的中国依然在通往未来的道路上踽踽独行。中国需要改革的戈尔巴乔夫，但改革的戈尔巴乔夫们肯定不希望自己的改革会失败。

各位，我讲了一通苏联与戈尔巴乔夫，让八十多岁、躺着的戈氏也中枪了，也让想听我对中国政局发飙犀利看法的朋友失望了。最后请允许我开个玩笑：假如我是戈尔巴乔夫，我会怎么做呢？我想我别无选择，我会顺应历史潮流，搞一个使苏联走向自由、民主、法治与富强的顶层设计，然后我会紧紧抓住对军警以及国家安全的控制，掌握改革的主动权，把左右等极端派都打下去，然后一步一步去实施自己的改革措施——

可惜我不是戈尔巴乔夫，而且即便我强迫自己对戈尔巴乔夫们抱有幻想，我也对他代表的那个体制实在没有多少信心，所以，我还是倾向认同戈尔巴乔夫的最大成功就在于他的失败。希望未来的戈尔巴乔夫们能够成功，并把他们自己的成功变成人民、国家和民族的成功！

谢谢各位！

杨恒均 2014.2.21

杨恒均 2015-08-23 08:53:39