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The Casualties of China's Economic Reforms

The next round of economic reforms should address China’s widening wealth gap.

By Yang Hengjun

August 07, 2014

Peking University’s Institute of Social Science Survey recently issued the “2014 Report on the Development of People’s Livelihood in China.” Quoting from the report, People’s Daily pointed out that wealth inequality in China has been increasing quickly. China’s Gini coefficient [Ed's note: the most commonly used measure of wealth inequality, measured on a scale of 0-1] was 0.45 in 1995; it had grown to 0.55 in 2002 and reached 0.73 in 2012. Today, China’s wealthiest one percent account for over one-third of China’s total wealth, while the bottom 25 percent represent only one percent of the country’s wealth. There are two notable characteristics of the recent changes in wealth inequality. First, households where family members work for the government are noticeably better off than other households. In addition, their wealth is increasing far more than the wealth of families who work outside the system. Second, the wealth of middle-class households is increasing more rapidly than the wealth of both low and high-income families.

This report attracted my attention. The widening gap between the rich and the poor is a serious problem, especially in a Confucian-based East Asian society that believes in the proverb “inequality, rather than want, is the cause of trouble.” Even more seriously, however, the wealth gap is caused by the use of power. Hong Kongand several Western countries also have Gini coefficients that are close to (or even worse than) China’s. But those wealth gaps have obvious causes in each individual’s family background, educational level, and individual abilities. What about in mainland China? It’s crystal clear that political power and wealth are both concentrated in the hands of China’s “one percent.” In other words, corruption is the main cause for the widening gap between the rich and the poor in China.

This is a dangerous phenomenon! It’s especially dangerous as China has not established a democratic system that can alleviate conflicts between the people and the government, as Western countries have. If the trend continues, we might repeat the vicious cycle seen before in Chinese history: movements meant to fight corruption or even to oppose the rich and aid the poor become ever more common. Then the economic development and “harmonious society” created during years of stability disappear overnight, and China returns to the beginning of the historical cycle.

For Chinese society, the most serious problem is not actually the gap between rich or poor, nor even the inequality caused by corruption. Rather, the most critical problem is that social mobility has become frozen; there’s no possibility of moving up or down the wealth ladder. This is the reason for the helplessness and bitterness I have felt many times when traveling to China’s villages and meeting China’s migrant workers. If the current situation doesn’t change, China’s disadvantaged groups (the huge numbers of rural peasants, plus those migrants who traveled to the city to find work) have no chance for upward social mobility.

Before and after my recent visit to Tibet, I spent two weeks in the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta. There, I continued the social research that I have been doing for years on the living conditions of migrant workers (I began this research for the purpose of a specific report, but since then it has become more or less a “habit” for me, an essential way of staying in touch with this side of society). Many years after beginning this research, I’m still quite concerned about the circumstances and future prospects of these migrant workers. For years, I’ve followed 35 migrant workers (14 females and 21 males), and none of them have seen any real improvement in either their work or their lives (although I have lost contact with a few). Even worse, they all seem to be living for some imagined future, but they have no idea where this hope for the future comes from.

This is why I finally lost my temper the other day when talking with a friend who works within the system. At the time, my friend was talking about Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive becoming larger and larger. He said that some officials are starting to have second thoughts about anti-corruption and reform. If this situation continues, my friend predicted, it will likely influence economic reforms and social stability, which are held together by the bureaucratic system. I responded by saying that China is developing in the direction of “small government, large society” by gradually dismissing and downsizing government workers. That strategy will both reduce government power and alleviate society’s burden.

I didn’t expect my friend to immediately object to what I’d just said. He argued that it was impossible to downsize the government. Doing so would not only influence economic development, but could threaten social stability or even harm the status of the Party. He added, “Do you think that government officials are like workers or peasants? That you can sacrifice them on a whim? Sacrificing government officials and their interests is dangerous!”

It was this last part that made me explode. The reforms of the 1990s resulted in massive lay-offs. Overnight, tens of millions of workers lost their “iron rice bowls.” There were people who didn’t want to accept it, even those who actively resisted, but the government ruled with an iron fist and eventually the reforms went through. Even today, some of these people have grown old on the edge of poverty. On a certain level, we sacrificed them in exchange for huge reforms to the economic system. Later reforms aimed at spreading the “made in China” label around the world sacrificed hundreds of millions of migrant workers.

If we can say that reform has to sacrifice some interest groups, then we’ve definitely sacrificed common workers in exchange for some level of social development and prosperity. But the prosperity won through this sacrifice has components that are absolutely unhealthy, and even abnormal. For example, with prosperity came the dominance of certain interest groups, the rampant spread of corruption, and the loss of society’s moral “bottom line.” Our quick economic growth also made China the fastest country in history to nurture a group of “one percenters” who own one-third of the country’s wealth.

To deepen economic reforms and realize social and political reforms that will make society more just and more equitable, China will have to once more bring order out of chaos. When the time comes, it will be necessary to sacrifice certain interest groups, including those government officials who currently enjoy power and privilege.

This piece srcly appeared in Chinese on Yang Hengjun’s blog. The src post can be found here.

Yang Hengjun is a Chinese independent scholar, novelist, and blogger. He once worked in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. Yang received his Ph.D. from the University of Technology, Sydney in Australia. His Chinese language blog is featured on major Chinese current affairs and international relations portals and his pieces receive millions of hits each day. Yang’s blog can be accessed at www.yanghengjun.com

原文：

下一步改革会牺牲谁？

文 | 杨恒均

人民网引用北京大学中国社会科学调查中心发布的《中国民生发展报告2014》指出，中国的财产不平等程度在迅速升高：1995年我国财产的基尼系数为0.45，2002年为0.55，2012年我国家庭净财产的基尼系数达到0.73，顶端1%的家庭占有全国三分之一以上的财产，底端25%的家庭拥有的财产总量仅在1%左右。在家庭层次的财产不平等及其变化有两个特征：一、有家庭成员在体制内工作的家庭财产水平明显高于在体制外工作的家庭，在体制内工作的家庭财产的增长幅度也明显高于体制外家庭，这将导致体制内外家庭的财产差距进一步扩大。二、中等收入家庭财产增长幅度大，而低收入和高收入家庭的财产增长幅度相对较小。

这份报告引起我的注意。贫富差距拉大是个严重的问题，尤其在“不患寡而患不均”的东亚儒家社会，但更严重的则是这贫富不均是“权力”在作怪——中国的香港以及少数西方发达国家的基尼系数也超过或者逼近中国的程度，可那种贫富不均明显是由出身背景、教育程度以及能力大小决定的，在中国大陆呢？明眼人几乎都一清二楚：体制、权力和财富同那1%的家庭如影随形——换句话说，“腐败”是造成贫富差距的主要原因。

这是一种很危险的现象！加上我们目前并没有实现西方那种可以缓解官民矛盾的民主制度，这一现象继续下去，恐怕会重蹈中国历史上循环往复多次的恶性循环：反抗贪腐甚至打富济贫的运动此起彼伏，多年稳定换来的经济发展与社会“和谐”迟早毁于一旦，历史又一次回到原点……

对中国社会来说，最、最严重的还不是贫富差距甚至也不是贪腐造成贫富差距，而是贫富阶层几乎被固化，没有了上下流动的可能性。这也是在我“走遍中国”走到农村与农民工中时，屡次感到的无奈与痛苦。当前这种状态不改变，中国的“弱势群体”——广大的农民以及进城打工的农民工，基本上没有向上提升的机会与可能。

在西藏之行前后，我分别抽了两个星期去珠三角和长三角，延续我多年来对农民工生存状况的社会追踪调查（当初是为了写研究报告，后来变成我接触这方面社会的必备功课，成了我的“习惯”，并无具体学术目的与工作要求）。多年下来，对农民工的境遇与前途，我依然忧心忡忡。我跟踪的14位女工与21位男工，除了失去联系的，几乎所有的在工作、生活上都并没有什么进展与起色，更糟糕的是，他们仿佛都为了虚无缥缈的明天活着——可并不知道明天的希望在哪里。

这就是为什么在上海同体制内朋友聊天时，我终于失态，大怒了一次。当时朋友谈到习总反腐力度越来越大，一些体制内的人士对反腐与改革开始有抵触情绪，如果这种状况持续下去，很可能会影响“官本位”体制下的经济改革与社会发展。我说，那就向“小政府、大社会”的方向发展，逐步解雇、减少一批公务员，缩小公务员队伍。较少公权力同时，也减轻社会的负担。

没想到这位朋友一听就来劲了，他说，这不可能！想解雇缩小公务员队伍，那就不只是影响经济发展，而是有可能危及社会稳定，最终伤及执政党的地位。他补充说，你以为公务员是工人和农民吗？说牺牲就牺牲？牺牲公务员和官员的利益是很危险的！

他后面这句话，让我最终爆发了，我说，狗屁，上个世纪九十年代“改革”让工人下岗，几千万工人一夜之间失去了铁饭碗，也有人不服、鼓噪甚至抗争过，但政府用铁腕对付他们，最终也走过来了。至今虽然还有人生活在贫困边缘，不过，他们毕竟渐渐老去了。牺牲他们，从某种意义上说，换来了经济体制的一次大变革。随后“改革”又为了“中国制造”的廉价品销售全球而牺牲了上亿的农民工的利益与权益……

如果说“改革”一定要牺牲一些群体的利益，从工人到农民工的牺牲，确实换来了某种程度的社会发展与经济繁荣，但这一牺牲换来的繁荣与昌盛绝对有不健康与变态的成分：例如使得一些利益集团坐大，贪污腐败如此猖獗，社会底线滑落，并以人类历史上最快的速度培养出占全国财富三分之一的那1%的家族……

深化经济体制改革，实行让社会更加公正、公平的社会与政治体制改革，就是要再一次拨乱反正，必要的时候，是必须要牺牲一些利益集团和享受特权的那部分官员的利益的。

杨恒均 2014.7.28 “走遍中国”

杨恒均 2015-08-23 08:54:43