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4 Ways China Can Prepare for War in East Asia

Northeast Asia has become a potential powder keg. What should China do to prepare itself for possible conflict?

By Yang Hengjun

April 04, 2014

Over the past decades, the fuse for the powder keg of war moved from the Balkans to the Middle East. Now it has shifted to China’s backyard without us even noticing. Five years ago, if someone had told me that Northeast Asia would become the world’s leading powder keg, even more dangerous than the Middle East, I wouldn’t have believed it. But now, such a statement seems more and more like the truth.

After the U.S. military conquered Iraq, the “Arab Spring” bloomed in the Middle East and North Africa. Although the internal turmoil suffered by countries in this region shows no signs of abating, in terms of geopolitics the Middle East crisis has been greatly alleviated. Nowadays, there is only one “troublemaker” left – Iran, which would find it hard to cause a crisis without support ( not to mention Iran is not up to fighting with the United States and Israel). Iran’s recent willingness to give up its nuclear weapons program foreshadows a shift in the winds.

In contrast, the situation in Northeast Asia is decidedly not optimistic. Almost every responsible country in the world has age requirements for its top leader, usually requiring top leaders to be at least 40 years old. But North Korea is now under the control of a 30-year old young man. After taking office, this leader “lived up the the world’s expectations” — that is to say, he refused to follow China’s road of reform and opening up and refused to act according to common sense. He eliminated dissenters without a scruple, and will most likely continue to develop nuclear weapons.

And on top of that, add the problem of Japan.

On December 17 of last year, Japan passed its first National Security Strategy as well as revising its National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-Term Defense Program. In these documents, it’s easy to see a posture of arms expansion and war preparation aimed at the “China threat.” A few days later, one of my Japanese friends from Tokyo’s Waseda University sent me a half-joking message: “Mr. Yang, the sleeping lion of Japan is finally awake. Thanks to China for waking him up.”

I didn’t think this joke was very funny. I replied to him that I had only heard of the Napoleon quote that China is Asia’s sleeping lion. Who said that Japan is another “sleeping lion”? Was it Hitler?

A war of words was inevitable after that. However, I have to admit that the “sleeping lion” of China seems to be “sleeping in,” or at least after waking up it’s still confused, thinking it’s still dreaming. Could little Japan actually be more worthy of the name “sleeping lion”? Since the Meiji Restoration, it has won almost every war it’s fought, and even Japan’s final defeat was grand in scale: Japan became the only nation to have been beaten by atomic bombs. After World War II, although oppressed by the U.S. military occupation and a “peace constitution,” it rose rapidly to become a world power, with the second largest economy. Over the past years, because of the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, Japan’s international status has been steadily deteriorating and economic achievements have been hard to come by. It’s no wonder that some Japanese believe Japan can only renew it power by developing its military, raising its political status, and becoming a “normal country.”

It seems that only the “China threat” can make the U.S. loosen its control of Japan, allowing Japan the “legitimacy” to once again embark on a militaristic road. Of course, it’s been a long time since World War II ended and Japan is a sovereign state — in principle, it has the power to abolish the constitution imposed on Japan by the United States and to strive for military strength and political influence equal to its economic strength. However, Japan’s military expansion has a clear-cut goal — to deal with the “China threat.” This is a phenomenon rarely seen in other countries’ decisions to expand military capabilities. China’s concern is justified.

The crisis in Northeast Asia on the surface is entangled with territorial and historical factors, but actually its deeper cause is ideology. The Cold War in Europe ended with the announcement of German unification, but in Northeast Asia it still continues. In today’s world, territorial and historical factors are unlikely to cause a major war. However, a war caused by religion and ideology won’t stay small. In this sense, it is necessary for China to be well-prepared for war. In my personal opinion, there are four things China must do to prepare.

1. Establish core values which can unify the Chinese people. Develop and promote our own culture. I’m listing this point first for a reason. Looking back at all of China’s foreign wars in modern and contemporary history, we can take a lesson from these defeats. It’s not hard to see that China’s defeats weren’t caused by a lack of national strength or military power. Rather, defeat came because China lacked a value system that could unite the country and the nation. Soldiers and the public must know what they are protecting when they take up arms, what they are fighting for. Only in this way can the war go on.

When I was young, I was a military buff. I once joined a top U.S. military think tank, the Atlantic Council, becoming the youngest senior researcher there. I was in contact with a lot of senior military talents and generals from around the world, especially the U.S. But after several years, my research on war can be summarized using a sentence from an earlier researcher: a small war replies on weapons, a medium war relies on power, and a great war relies on popular support. Because of this conclusion, my personal interest quickly turned from military affairs to politics, ultimately to the values system.

In this sense, at the 18^th National Party Congress, when Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish core values with Chinese characteristics and to enhance and develop the Chinese culture, this wasn’t just a reform for the cultural, educational and political sphere. Xi’s idea could also be a great strategy that serves as the deciding factor in future wars.

2. Focus on the people’s livelihood and take human rights seriously. Modern war is different from previous wars, which relied solely on defending a country or on the call of “nationalism” to rouse the population and soldiers and win the war. Today, this is far from enough. Imagine that, on issues touching the people’s livelihood, a government is biased, or event acts unfairly and unjustly, violating the rights of citizens. In that case, it’s highly likely that its populace will help “invaders.” Actually, in recent years, whether the U.S. bombed Yugoslavia or sent troops to Iraq, it seems in almost all cases to have won a great deal of support from local people.

During the Sino-Japanese War, a large number of “traitors” appeared in China. Of course these traitors should be denounced and punished, but we still have dug deep to ask ourselves why there were so many traitors. At the time, the government was corrupt and busy with civil war. It didn’t treat the people as humans, but imposed excessive taxes and forced able-bodied men into the army. How was the government any different from the “Japanese devils”? For the people, did it really make a big difference whether they were bullied by the Japanese or by their own government? Mao Zedong said that people, rather than weapons, are the decisive factor in war. This saying it still valid today. If we do not remember this point, when war breaks out, there won’t be “traitors” but there could be countless “guides” willing to help the enemy.

In the decision from November’s Third Plenum, the government proposed for the first time paying more attention to citizens’ human rights. In the next round of reforms, the government promised to focus on justice and fairness, and I hope they can succeed. This is an important strategy.

3. Develop military equipment and modern weapons. I’m putting this point third, but that doesn’t mean it’s not important. Just as I said earlier, “a small war relies on weapons.” Right now, China’s conflicts in the East China Sea (with Japan) and the South China Sea (with the Philippines) would most likely only be very limited wars. These small-scale wars would rely only on weapons.

Currently, as Japan is supported by the U.S. military, China does not have any advantage in terms of weapons. In a small-scale conflict, it is possible that China would lose embarrassingly – in terms of the weapons that would be used in a small conflict, China is more than 20 years behind the U.S. By comparison, when it comes to weapons used in a large-scale conflict, such as cruise missiles, the gap between China and the U.S. is much smaller.

Certainly, the gap is smallest when it comes to strategic weapons, and we can say that there really is no gap — there’s no substantive difference between destroying something once and destroying it a hundred times. It’s no longer a question that China continues to develop modern weapons. The question is whether the soldiers using these modern weapons also have modernized their guiding ideology and management.

4. Make more friends in the international community. Nowadays, it’s very difficult to have a war only between two countries. Often, war involved many countries or is even a conflict between two alliance groups. Forming an alliance requires two conditions: values and economic interest. In terms of economic interest, China has the advantage. “He who has the gold makes the rules,” as the saying goes. However, in terms of values, China belongs to a distinct minority in the international community. In the past few years, there has been less emphasis on ideology, but we still must pay attention. China can’t get too close to international aberrations like North Korea, or else it will lose moral support from many countries. Also, to coin a phrase, “With friends like North Korea, who needs enemies?”

Personally, I do not support any type of war, and I also do not believe that war is inevitable. However, a proactive response and good preparation are often the most effective ways to avoid war. Modernized weapons and military management, as well as a well-trained army, are no doubt essential. But even more important factors are the unity of a country and support from the people.

This piece srcly appeared in Chinese on Yang Hengjun’s blog. The src post can be found here.

Yang Hengjun is a Chinese independent scholar, novelist, and blogger. He once worked in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. Yang received his Ph.D. from the University of Technology, Sydney in Australia. His Chinese language blog is featured on major Chinese current affairs and international relations portals and his pieces receive millions of hits each day. Yang’s blog can be accessed at www.yanghengjun.com

原文：

东北亚成火药桶，中国准备好打仗没有？

文 | 杨恒均

一个世纪里，世界热战的导火线从巴尔干延烧到中东，现在又不知不觉地转移到中国身边。如果五年前有人告诉我，东北亚会成为比中东还危险的世界头号火药桶，我肯定不会相信，但如今，这种说法越来越接近事实。

伊拉克被美军征服后，中东、北非又迎来了“阿拉伯之春”，这个地区各国内部动荡虽然有增无减，但地缘政治上的中东危机已经大大缓和。目前“麻烦制造者”就剩一个伊朗，孤掌难鸣不说，还根本不是美、以的对手。最近伊朗宣布放弃核子计划，就是改弦易辙的前兆。

反观东北亚，情况并不乐观。一位三十岁的年轻人掌握了朝鲜大权——世界上几乎所有负责任的国家对最高领导人都有年龄要求，一般不会让40岁以下的人出任第一把手，此人上台后果然“不负众望”，不走中国改革开放之路，且不按常理出牌，肆无忌惮清除异己，并有可能继续发展核武。现在又加上一个日本。

17日，日本通过战后首个《国家安全保障战略》以及《防卫计划大纲》、《中期防卫力量整备计划》，针对“中国威胁”的扩军备战态势一目了然。今天上午，我在早稻田大学的一位日本网友发来一条半开玩笑的信息：杨先生，亚洲的睡狮日本终于醒了。感谢中国弄醒了他。

这玩笑可不怎么好笑。我回了他一条：只听拿破仑说过中国是亚洲的睡狮，谁说过日本是亚洲的睡狮？难道是希特勒？

唇枪舌战免不了，但不得不承认，中国这头睡狮是睡过头了，且醒来后还迷迷糊糊，以为还在梦中。也许小小的日本才更配为“睡狮”吧？明治维新后几乎是无战不胜，最后连失败都轰轰烈烈：成为世界上唯一一个被原子弹打败的民族。二战后，被美国驻军与和平宪法压着，又迅速崛起为世界第二经济强国。这些年，由于冷战的结束与中国的崛起，日本的国际地位每况愈下，经济难有大作为，难怪一些日本人认为，日本要重新崛起，非得发展军事、提升政治地位、变成“正常国家”不可。

看起来，只有“中国威胁”才会让美国放松对日本的控制，让日本“名正言顺”地重新走上武装之路。当然，二战过去这么久，日本作为一个主权国家，原则上说有权废除美国强加给他的宪法，争取与他经济实力相当的军事实力与政治影响力。但日本的扩军具有鲜明的目标——应对“中国威胁”，这倒是各国发展军备时少有的现象，中国忧心也是有道理的。

东北亚危机表面上看是领土与历史因素绞缠不清，其实深层的原因依然是意识形态。冷战在欧洲以东西德的统一而宣告结束，在东北亚其实依然在继续。当今世界，领土与历史因素很难爆发大战，但宗教和意识形态之战，一旦爆发，就不会太小。从这个意义上说，中国做好备战准备，也是有必要的。以我个人之见，中国如何备战，要做好哪些准备呢？

第一，树立能够凝聚国人的核心价值观，发展、弘扬自己的文化。我把这点放在第一不是没有原因的，回顾一下中国近、现代历史上历次涉外战争，总结一下失败的教训，我们不难发现战败的主要原因并不是国力不强、军力不足，而是缺乏凝聚一个国家一个民族的价值理念。军人和民众必须知道拿起武器保卫的是什么，为何而战，这场战争才能进行下去。

我年轻时曾经是个军事迷，并且一度混进了美国最顶级的军事智库大西洋理事会，成为最年轻的资深研究员，接触了来自世界各国尤其是美国的高级军事人才与将领。但几年下来，我对战争的研究最终只得到了一句前人早就总结出的结论：小战靠武器，中战靠国力，大战靠民心。因为有了这个“结论”，我个人的兴趣也迅速从军事到政治，最终转移到价值理念与制度上。

从这个意义上说，习近平在十八大中强调的要建立中国特色的核心价值观与弘扬、发展中国文化，就不仅仅是文化领域、教育领域与政治领域的改革，而是可以决定未来战争胜负的大战略了。

第二，关注民生、重视人权。现代战争已经同过去的有很大不同，仅仅靠保卫一个国家或者一个民族的“民族主义”号召已远远不足以动员民众与军人去打赢一场战争。如果一个政府在民生问题上有失偏颇，甚至不公、不正，侵犯公民权利，那么民众帮助“侵略者”入侵的事很有可能发生。实际上，这些年美国人无论是轰炸南斯拉夫，还是出兵伊拉克，几乎都得到了当地民众大量的支持。

抗日战争中，中国出现了大量的“汉奸”，固然必须谴责并追责，但我们却始终没有深刻反省一下，为什么会出现那么多“汉奸”？当时的政府贪污腐败、忙于内战，不把民众当人，还横征暴敛、强拉壮丁，他们和日本鬼子有什么区别？被日本鬼子欺负同被自己的政府欺负，真有很大的不同吗？毛泽东说过，决定战争胜负的是人，而不是武器。这个显然没有过时。不记住这一点，一旦开战，“汉奸”没有了，但“带路党”恐怕多不胜数。

十八大三中全会中决定中首次提到政府应更多关注公民人权，并在进一步改革中，关注公正、公平，希望能够真正做到。这也是一项大战略。

第三，我把军事装备与现代化武器放在第三位，并不是说它不重要，尤其是我前面说的“小打靠武器”，中国目前在东海（同日本）以及南海（同菲律宾等）的冲突很可能是非常有限的战争，而这种小规模的战争依赖的只能是武器装备。

目前由于日本有美军的支持，中国在武器装备上并不占任何便宜。在一场小规模的冲突中，中国甚至有可能输得很难堪——中国同美国在小冲突上能够用上的武器上的差距远远超过20年。相比来说，在大规模的冲突武器——例如巡航导弹之类的，差距反而没有这么大。

当然，差距最小的是战略武器，可以说几乎没有差距——因为摧毁一次同摧毁一百次并没有什么实质区别。中国继续发展现代化武器应该不是问题，问题反而是我们使用现代化武器的军人是否在指导思想与管理上现代化了。

第四，在国际上尽量团结多一些朋友。当今的战争，很难只是两个国家之间的，往往卷入更多国家甚至是两个联盟之间的争斗。结盟的条件一是价值理念，二是经济利益。在经济利益上中国占优势，有钱能使鬼推磨。但在价值理念上，中国属于国际上有特色的极少数派。这些年虽然比较淡化意识形态，可千万要注意，不能同朝鲜这种国际怪胎走得太近，否则会失去很多国家道义上的支持。再说，有了朝鲜这种朋友，你还需要敌人吗？

我个人不支持任何形式的战争，也不认为战争是不可避免的，但积极应对，准备好打仗，往往是避免战争最行之有效的办法。现代化的武器与军事管理以及训练有素的军队固然必不可少，但更重要的是一个国家的凝聚力，是民心。

杨恒均2013.12.18北京

杨恒均 2015-08-23 08:53:56