Crimea: Ideals and Reality, Glory and Dreams(克里米亚:理想与现实,光荣与梦想)

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杨恒均微信号:yanghengjun2013

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美国THE DIPLOMAT网站2014年起推出杨恒均专栏,将杨恒均的部分博文翻译成英文。本平台将选登部分文章,供英语爱好者阅读。


Crimea: Ideals and Reality, Glory and Dreams

The Crimea incident reflects Putin’s domestic aspirations; China is well advised to stay neutral.



By Yang Hengjun

March 21, 2014


By abstaining on the UN vote on Crimea, China made a good choice. I wonder, is China the most frequent abstainer from UN Security Council votes? Earlier, when China’s international clout was lower, abstaining from voting was always interpreted as a sign of helplessness and a desire to avoid trouble. However, now that China has grown strong, the interpretation is different. Now it seems that China is showing its strength and its strategic independence through abstention votes. The policy of “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time” is the same way—when China was weak, it was the only choice, but now that China is strong it becomes a conscious, free choice. In the international chess match, the same phrase now has a completely different meaning.

Today we often hear people shout that China should get rid of the policy of “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time,” because they take Vladimir Putin as their spiritual teacher. They point out that Putin dares to “say no” to the West and to the whole world. In their eyes, “saying no” is the same as abandoning the “hiding and biding” policy. However, the foreign policy of a state should be based on national interests, national security and national stability, and more importantly on economic development and the improvement of people’s lives. Who is not able to “say no”? During a time when many Chinese people were starving to death, our whole nation kept “saying no” to the world. Even those countries who wanted to provide aid to us were rejected with a “no.” Was it really that great?

Why does Putin want to “say no”? It’s because the West has no respect for him. Whether or not Putin “says no” makes little difference on the international stage. His “no” has never brought any benefits to Russia, so why does he keep saying it? The answer is that Putin’s “saying no” to the West is directed at a Russian audience—he wants to use this to build up a tough-guy image for himself and arouse the nationalistic mood among the Russian people. Afterwards, he can ensure that he can remain the “elected president” for his entire life. This is Putin’s dream.

Since Putin took office in 2000, international oil prices have been soaring. Putin took advantage of his good luck and stylized himself as “Putin the Great” who restored Russia’s glory…

Diplomatic relations can be roughly categorized into realism (utilitarianism) and idealism (led by ideology and philosophy). Although realism has been dominant in modern times, idealism has seemingly been everywhere and nowhere. I can distinguish the diplomatic practices of China and U.S. in this way: U.S. is a realist with ideals, while China is a realistic idealist. The “realism” of each country is more or less the same, but the ideals are not. The U.S. adores liberty and democracy while China worships the idea of a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. Despite its ideals, the U.S. often makes compromises in its philosophy for practical benefits. And although China is relatively realist, it sometimes makes some concessions in its realism to prioritize principles such as the stability of the state and the leadership of the ruling party. It’s because of such compromises and concessions by the U.S. and China that “new type great power relations” becomes possible.

Russia, however, is a realist through and through. Of course, you can’t blame Russia for this…

Nevertheless, realism is not easy. As we all know, realist foreign policy relies on the strength of a state. What kind of strength does Russia have? The money from selling oil may be barely enough to improve people’s livelihood and therefore ensure that Putin wins consecutive terms, but this is not enough to impress the international community. But Putin is smarter than anyone else. Without ideals, and without the power to pursue realist goals abroad, Putin wanted to have the people consider him as a hero, to believe that without Putin they would be bullied by foreigners. And the only way to do that was to stoke up nationalism by habitually opposing the West and always having the word “no” on his lips.

That is why Putin has never hesitated in saying “no” to the West, especially the U.S., whenever he could. Although internationally such opposition amounts to nothing, he has enjoyed an increasingly higher reputation among the “Russian people” who grew up under the Soviet Union. In today’s Russia, which rarely mentions freedom and democracy but also doesn’t dare to raise Soviet ideology, “Putin” has become the “ideology” and “ideal” of the state. At this time, Crimea is just like manna from heaven, a God-given opportunity to Putin.

Putin just has to take Crimea. Meanwhile, considering Russia’s national interests and security, annexing Crimea had a hundred benefits and no harms. The West’s choices are extremely limited. Putin will never be afraid of military intervention. The Soviet Union was defeated in a clash of ideology and wills, not in real battles. With this in mind, Putin would rather resort to arms than confront the U.S. in a battle of ideals and convictions.

The U.S. knows this, and won’t resort to the use of force. As for economic sanctions, oil is the mainstay of Russia’s economy and (because shale gas in the U.S. has not started mass production) Russia’s oil is irreplaceable. And in terms of trade restrictions, don’t forget about China. Without the involvement of China, the world’s second largest economy, a country that can manufacture anything except sophisticated weapons (which Russia, incidentally, does make), how can economic sanctions work?

The timing of Russia’s confrontation with the U.S. is good for China not only in terms of economy and military “benefits,” but even more so in the political dimension. The “new type great power relations” between China and the U.S. is just waiting for a final push—this confrontation from Putin could help the U.S. to become more realistic and more sober-minded. America, don’t spend all day thinking about “peaceful evolution” in Beijing—China is just a panda; your “enemy” is a polar bear.

Someone may say that China should take this chance to ally with Russia in confronting the United States. I say to these people, you can’t defeat the U.S, so what’s the use of wasting human resources, materials, and energy? And allying with Russia is even less appealing—there’s no need to, and taking a long-term view there are too many variables to consider. When Putin steps down or dies, Russia will change overnight—at that time, when the Russian people have lost “Putin the Great,” will they have any choice other than embracing liberty and democracy? However, China has options and thus doesn’t need to tie itself to any great power.

The problems in Crimea are complicated and there’s some truth to each side. If you really want to separate right from wrong, you’ll probably find that there’s not even a unified standard to determine “right” and “wrong.” According to the constitution of Ukraine, the referendum of Crimea is certainly unlawful. But just like the pursuit of liberty and democracy, national self-determination can supersede any national constitution. Otherwise, how did so many colonized and newly established nations achieve their independence? And how did the 15 unified republics of the Soviet Union vote to secede regardless of the constitution of Soviet Union?

The complexity of Crimea also comes from this: Putin’s merging with Crimea not only broke the pattern of international relations in the post-Cold War era, but also went against the main trend of history in the past 100 years. What main trend of history? As everyone knows, in the past 100 years, almost all the great empires have disintegrated (including China, as when Russia helped Outer Mongolia split off). These empires have broken up into smaller nations. This trend began with colonized areas one by one gaining independence, and continued up until the collapse of Soviet Union. Looking back over many years, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the only case in which a great power acquired so a large piece of territory in an instant (of course, this does not include the large piece of land which was stolen from China’s hands by Russia in the past). Only the God who gave this manna to Russia knows what price Russia will pay for this in the future.

The best choice for China in the Crimea problem is to make no choice; the best stance for China is not to take sides. China needs a peaceful international environment. In the future, China should both develop with the U.S. a no-confrontation, no-conflict, win-win “new type great power relationship.” But China should also develop a “new type great power relationship” with Russia that is neutral, not an alliance. In addition, China should focus on developing multilateral relationships with Europe, the Americas, and Australia, while at the same time putting more efforts and investing more energy into improving relations with neighboring countries. If those major relationships are well managed, even if the world experiences more “Crimea incidents,” how could it have a big impact on China’s interests and dreams?


This piece srcly appeared in Chinese on Yang Hengjun’s blog. The src post can be found here.

Yang Hengjun is a Chinese independent scholar, novelist, and blogger. He once worked in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. Yang received his Ph.D. from the University of Technology, Sydney in Australia. His Chinese language blog is featured on major Chinese current affairs and international relations portals and his pieces receive millions of hits each day. Yang’s blog can be accessed at www.yanghengjun.com


原文:


克里米亚:理想与现实,光荣与梦想


文 | 杨恒均



各位同学好,克里米亚人家讲得够多了,我今天讲更大一点的,好不好?


中国在联合国投弃权票是不错的选择。中国恐怕是在联合国安理会投最多弃权票的国家吧?以前中国的国际地位较低时,投弃权票总给人一种无奈和逃避的印象,但强大了后再投弃权票就不同了,给人一种进退由我,展示力量的感觉。正如同样是“韬光养晦”,贫弱时是别无选择,强大时是选择在我,这在国际博弈中可并不是同一个概念。


现在老是听到有人叫喊要丢掉“韬光养晦”,他们都以普京为精神教父。他们说你看普京就敢对西方对世界说“不”。在他们看来,敢说“不”就是丢掉了“韬光养晦”。殊不知,一个国家的外交应该为国家利益、国家安全与国家稳定以及更重要的经济发展与人民生活的改善为标准。说“不”谁不会?中国那几年饿死好多人时我们全国人民都在对世界说“不”,连有国家想援助咱们,都被“不”掉了,很牛B吗?


普京为什么要说“不”?那是因为西方根本不尿他,他说不说“不”,在国际上区别并不大,他的“不”从来没有给俄国带来利益,可他为啥还要说“不”?因为这个“不”是说给俄国人听的,他要用这个“不”塑造自己硬汉的形象,激起俄国人的民族主义情感,然后,确保自己能够当一位终身的“民选总统”。这是普京的梦想啊。


普京2000年上台后,国际油价一路飙升,他仗着自己的这点好运气,俨然把自己打扮成复兴俄国的“普京大帝”,其实这个前克格勃心里很清楚,整个克格勃都不是人家的对手,靠你一个背叛原组织的中级克格勃干部就想翻转乾坤?普京也知道自己现在最大的依仗其实是推翻克格勃之后建立起来的俄国民主制度,而俄罗斯的民主制度几乎全部仰赖叶利钦执政的八年。那段时间虽然生活艰难,但俄罗斯的民主基础毕竟打下千年基业。普京一边吃石油老本,一边啃制度的老本,还同时做着“普京大帝”的梦。


各位知道,在外交关系领域,粗分为现实主义(功利主义)和理想主义(以意识形态与理念为主),虽说现实主义在近现代一直占主导地位,但理想主义始终若即若离。我是这样划分中美两国外交实践的:美国是有理想的现实主义者,中国是现实的理想主义者。“现实”差别不大,理想却不尽相同:美国推崇的自由民主,中国推崇中国特色的社会主义民主。美国虽有理想,但常常为了现实利益而理念上做出妥协,中国虽然比较现实,但也会为了执政党领导和国家稳定这样的信念而在现实中做出让步。正因为中美两国的“妥协”和“让步”,才使得“新型大国关系”成为可能。


俄罗斯呢,却是一个不折不扣的现实主义者。当然,这不能全怪他,前苏联可是一个超级理想主义者,怀抱社会主义理念与解放全人类的理想,建立了社会主义大家庭,试图蚕食西方资本主义,结果弄到最后,社会主义阵营不但没有击败西方世界,当头的苏联反倒成了唯一一个被不友好的社会主义国家包围的国家——中国反对他,南斯拉夫、捷克、波兰,哪一个对他有好感?


好不容易土崩瓦解,也建立了民主制度,可西方就是对他不冷不热,当初答应解散北约的承诺不但不兑现,反而变本加厉,一路东扩,包抄俄国。在这种情况下,俄罗斯是有苦难言,民主这东西是无法回头的,社会主义理想又不知道丢到哪里去了。所以,普京的俄罗斯外交就采取了两边理想都不沾边的纯粹的现实主义——没有理想的现实主义,或者说功利主义,是很可怕的。就像一个没有信仰的唯利是图的家伙,是相当难缠的。


但现实主义也不是那么好弄的。我们知道现实主义外交是要靠实力的,俄罗斯有啥实力?出卖石油的钱勉强够改善民生以保证他继续当选,不足以在国际上呼风唤雨。但普京比谁都聪明——当过特务又没有被灭掉,一般都比较聪明,这个你们都知道吧——在没有理想,现实主义又无法走出国门的情况下,要想民众视他为英雄,觉得少了他就会被外国人欺负到家门口,唯一的办法就是煽动民族主义,就是习惯性地站出来反对西方,把“不”字挂在嘴边。


所以这些年,普京能对西方尤其是美国说“不”的,绝不会吝啬,绝不会犹豫,虽然在国际上说了等于没说,但他却在那批苏联时代培养起来的“俄国人民”中逐步享受到极高的声誉。我们看到,很少提民主自由,也不敢多提前苏联意识形态的俄国,“普京”成了他们的“意识形态”,成了他们的“理想”。这个时候,克里米亚又如从天而降的馅饼,给了普京天赐良机。


普京是要定了克里米亚。而且,克里米亚兼入俄国,对俄国的国家利益与安全来说,还真是百利而无一害。至于西方能够做的,非常有限。普京不会害怕军事干涉的。苏联是在意识形态与意志的对决中败给美国的,而不是败在真枪真刀的对垒中。这一点普京很清楚,他宁愿兵戎相见,绝不愿意再拿理念与信念来对抗美国。


美国也很清楚,所以他也不会动用武力。至于经济制裁,俄国的经济支柱是石油,美国的页岩气还没有成批量生产,暂时无法取代石油,普京也不愿意看那么远。至于限制贸易往来之类的,不要忘记还有中国。世界第二大经济体,除了尖端武器其它啥都造得出的中国不加入的经济制裁,能有什么效果?更何况,俄国是除了尖端武器之外啥都造不出的国家。


苏联这个时候跳出来同美国对抗,对中国来说当然不只是经济和军事方面的“利好”,政治方面更是不可估量。在中美两国“新型大国关系”就差临时门一脚时,普京同美国的对抗,多少可以帮助美国更现实、更清醒一些,不要再整天想着和平演变北京,你的“敌人”还是北极熊啊,中国只不过是一只熊猫嘛。


至于有人说中国应该借机联合俄国对抗美国,我说你肯定是想多了,美国你是对抗不掉的,既然对抗不掉,花那个人力、物力和精力折腾啥?而联合俄国更是味同嚼蜡,毫无必要,更何况从长远来说,俄国的变数实在太大了,普京下台或者死去,就会让俄国一夜之间变天——那时,没有了“普京大帝”的俄国人除了拥抱自由民主之外,还有什么选择?但中国有选择,那就是没有必要把自己同任何一个大国绑在一起。


克里米亚的问题很复杂,公说公有理,婆说婆有理,真要想分出对错时,你恐怕连判断对错的标准都无法统一。按照乌克兰宪法,克里米亚公投当然是非法的,但民族自决同追求民主自由一样,都是超越任何国家“宪法”的,否则世界上那么多殖民地和新建立的国家是如何独立的?当初苏联十五个加盟共和国又是如何不顾苏联宪法而投票独立的?


克里米亚局势的复杂性还在于,普京兼并克里米亚不但打破了冷战后的国际关系格局,也忤逆了百年来的历史大趋势。什么是历史大趋势?大家都知道,过去一百年,大趋势是几乎所有大帝国都在瓦解(包括中国在内,外蒙等不是也被苏联弄走了),不停地分成更多的小国家。这个是从殖民地纷纷独立开始的,一直延续到苏联解体。俄国这次兼并克里米亚确实是这么多年来唯一一个大国不被分割,反而一下子增加了那么多国土面积(当然,这里不包括老毛子以前从我们手里夺走的那么大一片土地)。不过,没有免费的午餐,俄国今后可能会为此付出怎样的代价,恐怕只有掉下馅饼的天知道。


中国在克里米亚问题上不做选择就是最好的选择,不选边站就是最好的立场。中国需要和平的国际环境,今后既要发展同美国不对抗、不冲突,合作双赢的“新型大国关系”,也要同俄国发展一种不结盟、不选边站的“新型大国关系”。另外,就是在注重发展同欧洲、美洲、澳洲等国家的多边关系时,加大力量和投入努力搞好同周边国家的关系。以上几大关系处理好了,世界上再发生几个克里米亚事件,对中国的利益与梦想又能有多大的损害?


杨恒均 2014.3.20 (根据19日同香港大学生谈话记录整理)





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